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Abstract 
 
This research focuses on the relationship between the quality of financial reporting and the level 
of corporate governance of Brazilian firms, particularly between New Market and Traditional 
Market. We measure earnings quality based on a widely used accruals model. Governance quality 
is represented by the type of market the firms chooses to be listed in. Firms that opt for the New 
Market must apply more stringent governance principles. The empirical analysis shows evidence 
of a positive relationship between the quality of financial reporting and the level of corporate 
governance. Thus, firms listed on the New Market characterized by better governance practices 
evidence better quality financial reporting.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The quality of financial information in general and 
of earnings in particular is important for investors, 
creditors and other stakeholders in the firm. The 
quality of earnings is a function of the firm's 
fundamental performance and thus evidence about 
earnings quality is relevant to financial statement 
users in their economic decisions (Dechow et al., 
2010). The governance structure in place in the firm 
is another important mechanism for outside 
investors. Governance provides outsiders who are at 
an informational disadvantage some insurance that 
manager’s actions are not self-interest but rather in 
benefit of outsider investors (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986).  
Prior accounting and finance literature has 
shown a link between earnings quality and 
governance structures (Dechow and Dichev 2002; 
Larcker et al. 2007). The aim of his study is to 
investigate this link in a particular setting: the New 
Market in Brazil stock exchange (BM&FBOVESPA). 
Specifically, we compare the earnings quality of 
Brazilian firms listed in the Traditional Markets with 
the earnings quality of firm listed in the New Market 
in the period 2001-2011. The adoption of stringent 
governance practices is the key differentiator of the 
New Market. In addition in the Traditional Market 
firms are not required to report financial 
information regularly on a quarterly based.  
According to the rules of the Brazilian stock 
exchange (BM&FBOVESPA) for a firm to be listed in 
the New Market it has to adopt a set of corporate 
rules that increase the rights of shareholders and 
also put in place a more transparent and 
comprehensive financial information disclosure 
policy. Example of these rules are: (i) allows only 
common stock; (ii) in the case of control sale, all 
shareholders have the right to sell their shares at the 
same price; (iii) if the company opt out of the list or 
cancel the contract with BM&FBOVESPA, will make a 
public offer to buy back the shares of all 
shareholders; (iv) the Board of Directors must be 
composed of at least five members, of which at least 
20% must be independent with unified term of up to 
two years; (v) the company must commit to maintain 
at least 25% of shares outstanding; (vi) the disclosure 
of financial information must be complete, including 
quarterly reports reviewed by an independent 
auditor and, (vii) the company shall provide annual 
financial reports in an internationally accepted 
model. 
The Brazilian New Market is a particularly 
interesting setting to test the relation between 
earnings quality and governance for several reasons. 
First, firms listed in the New Market are by 
definition adherent to high governance levels. This 
avoids having to define “good governance” which 
can be quite subjective given that governance 
encompasses a large variety of structures that often 
complement or substitute each other (e.g. board 
structure, manager characteristics, internal control 
systems and accounting and auditing mechanisms). 
Second, comparing the earnings quality for Brazilian 
firms ensures that all the sample firms are subject 
to the same legal, economic and institutional 
environment and thus reduces the problem of 
confounding effects. For example, all firms are 
subject to monitoring and supervision of the stock 
exchange authorities. Third, the Brazilian market is a 
growing and active market and represents one of the 
most important emergent markets in the world. 
To measure earnings quality we rely in one of 
the most commonly used measure: the accrual 
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quality measure proposed by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) based on the original model of Jones (1991). 
Although there are many different measures to 
assess earnings quality the accruals methods remain 
one of the most accepted and used (Francis et al. 
2004)  
 
2.  PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS  
 
The relation between corporate governance and 
earnings quality is analyzed for example in Beasley 
(1996), Klein (2002) and Gaio and Raposo (2014). 
Governance problems are linked to problems in 
earnings quality (Imhoff, 2003; Parker, 2007; Sharma 
et al., 2008).  
According to Beasley (1996) and Klein (2002), 
to address problems that have been largely 
explained by the quality of accounting and auditing, 
it is necessary to initially address the corporate 
governance weaknesses. Gaio and Raposo (2014) 
report that earnings quality affects firm valuation. 
The results suggest a substitute relationship 
between corporate governance and earnings quality.  
Regulators such as the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has highlighted the 
importance of compliance with good governance 
standards as a way to improve capital market 
informativeness and efficiency (SEC, 2016). 
 The existence of stricter regulation of financial 
reports led to a change in accounting practices of 
organizations with a renewed focus on the integrity 
of financial and non-financial information. The 
corporate governance issues are also concerned with 
the creation of good management accounting 
practices that can provide important information for 
administrators on issues such as strategic definition 
of the company (Seal, 2006). 
Other authors, such as Bushman and Smith 
(2001), also define the governance role in financial 
accounting information as the use of control 
mechanisms. These mechanisms would facilitate 
efficient management in organizations.  
Doyle et al. (2007) examined the relationship 
between quality of financial information, using 
models based on accruals and the quality of internal 
control. The authors found that firms with weak 
internal control have worse EQ values, this is worse 
quality of reported financial information. These 
results support the notion that the internal control 
environment which mirror governance practices is a 
key element to obtain high quality reporting.  
The results of Kent et al. (2010) also evidence a 
positive relationship between level of corporate 
governance and the quality of financial information. 
The results of this research suggest that the 
existence of good governance and good financial 
information is important to reduce uncertainties in 
the entity's operating environment. 
The empirical analysis presented in the article 
of Kent et al. (2010) provides a useful insight on the 
important issue of how the firms’ governance 
structures affect the quality of the results of firms 
reported. This research adopted the empirical model 
developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002), as it was 
considered that the estimated accruals properly 
reflect the actual cash flows and is a direct measure, 
with less residuals and more reliable quality of 
results. In this research it was stated that to be a 
control of financial information disclosed weaker, it 
leads to greater uncertainty of the company's 
environment for managers. Consequently, this 
phenomenon increases the probability of accrual 
estimation errors, resulting in information with 
lower reliability. Thus, it is fundamental that control 
practices to ensure compliance with financial 
reporting requirements, ensuring that the financial 
statements provide a true and fair view of the 
financial position of the company. 
The relationship between governance, behavior 
of managers and organizational performance is of 
fundamental importance to professionals, scholars 
and even politicians. There is evidence that several 
statistical governance factors that are associated 
with the probability of getting results considered of 
good quality. However, there are still a variety of 
reasons such as taxation, or the capital market 
pressures that create incentives for the company to 
manipulate the results (Larcker et al., 2007). In this 
context, the research carried out by Healy (1985), 
provides statistical evidence that changes in 
accounting procedures defaulted by managers, are 
often associated with the adoption or modification 
of their compensation plan through income earned. 
However, according to Francis et al. (2008), in 
the reputation perspective, the "efficient 
procurement" provides that managers with greater 
reputation are less likely to take actions and 
decisions that result in poor quality of financial 
information. These managers are primarily affected, 
with regard to its human capital if they do account 
and disclose choices that reduce the quality of 
financial information. Typically, firms that evidences 
financial results with higher quality levels are 
associated with lower capital costs. Thus, it is 
expected that the leading managers avoid actions 
that increase those costs, to the extent that they are 
considered better informed than managers without a 
fixed and good reputation. 
More recent studies, such as Mouselli et al., 
(2012) examined the relationship between two risk 
information indicators: quality model based on 
accruals and quality of disclosure of financial 
information. The results suggest a positive 
relationship between EQ and voluntary disclosure of 
financial results. These results have implications for 
the efforts of regulators to encourage companies to 
improve the dissemination of information in order 
to increase the incentives of managers to meet the 
expectations of good financial results. When 
managers engage less in results management, the 
quality of financial results information is greater, 
and more information will be released. Based on 
statistical tests, investors tend to see companies 
with higher levels of disclosure and the likelihood of 
demonstrating the financial results with superior 
quality. 
Taking into account the results in prior studies, 
we address the following important of question: 
does the creation of a separate market with high-
quality governance rules results in transparent 
financial information? This is an important question 
given the costs of implementation and monitoring of 
the New Market for regulators and policy-makers. 
The answer to this question is also of upmost 
interest for investors who wish to understand 
whether information reported by firms in the New 
Market is more useful for decision-making.  
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3.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
To test the conjecture that firms in the New Market 
have better earnings quality than the firms included 
in the Traditional Market of Brazil, we used the 
following multiple regression model (all variables 
are for firm i and year t): 
 
 
titititititititi IYLossLeverageSizeMarketEQ ,,,,4,3,2,10,  
 (1) 
 
EQ denotes earnings quality measured by the 
(Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Model explained below, 
Market is the variable of interest and takes the value 
of 1 if the firm is listed in the New Market, and zero 
if it is listed in the Traditional Market, Size denotes 
firm size measure as the natural log of total assets, 
Leverage denotes leverage and is measured as long 
term debt to total assets, Loss is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the firm 
experiences a loss and zero otherwise, Y represent 
year dummies, and I denote industries dummies. 
The dependent variable Earnings Quality (EQ) is 
our proxy for the quality of financial information. It 
is measured as the negative of the absolute value of 
the residuals of the following accruals model 
(Dechow and Dichev, 2002), so that higher variables 
indicate better reporting quality. 
 
tititititi CFOCFOCFOWC ,1,3,21,10,     (2) 
 
where:  
 
tiWC , is working capital calculated as the 
change from year t-1 to year t in accounts 
receivables, plus the change from year t-1 to year t in 
inventory, plus the change from year t-1 to year t in 
other current assets, minus the change from year t-1 
to year t in accounts payable, minus the change from 
year t-1 to year t in tax payable  
 
TaxPayableyableAccountsPassetsOtherCurrAInventoryceivableAccountsWC ti  Re,  (3) 
 
 CFO is cash flow from operations in year t-1, t 
and t+1.
 
All variables are scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of year t. 
The Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals model, 
which is based on Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. 
(1995), models the change in working capital 
accruals that is reflected in cash flow component of 
earnings. Working capital captures the normal 
operating conditions of the firm which are reflected 
in receivables, inventories and payables. The 
unexplained component of the model (i.e. the 
residual) represents the portion of working capital 
accruals not explained by the normal firm 
conditions and thus it is interpreted as the abnormal 
portion of accruals. To estimate the residuals of the 
model we use all the firms in the Brazilian stock 
market. As we have no expectation regarding the 
direction of possible manipulations we use the 
absolute value of the residual as it is common in the 
literature (Burgstahler et al., 2006). Higher residuals 
are indicative or higher abnormal accruals or higher 
earnings manipulation, i.e. poor earnings quality. To 
facilitate interpretation we multiply the value by 
minus one so that higher values of the measure 
indicate higher earnings quality (Burgstahler et al., 
2006). Thus the earnings quality measure is defined 
as follows: 
 
 1)( ,  tiabsEQ   (4) 
 
Variables Size, Lev and Loss included in 
equation (1) represent firm specific conditions that 
have been found to influence the quality of firms’ 
financial information.  
Size. According to Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
large firms have more stable and predictable 
operations and therefore the estimated residuals are 
expected to be lower for larger firms. Thus we 
expected a positive relation between firm size and 
earnings quality. 
Leverage. The existence of the debt can be a 
significant governance device (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). In firms with higher debt ratio, managers 
have incentives to engage more in manipulations of 
financial information in order to meet the terms of 
debt contracts. These actions reduce the quality of 
financial information (Dechow et al., 2010). We 
expect a negative relation between leverage and the 
earnings quality. 
Loss. Losses are indicators of severe negative 
shocks to the firm. During loss periods financial 
information is likely to contain higher estimation 
errors given that it is necessary to estimate 
infrequent items such as restructuring charges 
(Dechow and Dichev, 2002. We expected a negative 
relation between Loss and the earnings quality 
We add to the model year fixed effects in order 
to control for macro-economic events affecting all 
firms, and industry fixed effects to control for 
industry differences in earnings quality. 
 
4.  DATA AND SAMPLE  
 
The sample includes all listed Brazilian firms in the 
New Market and Traditional Market for the years 
2001 to 2011. After deleting observations with 
missing values the sample comprises 4,431 
observations for 579 firms. All financial data is 
obtained from Thomson Reuters Worldscope. 
Information about the two markets is collected 
directly from BM&FBOVESPA website. 
The 4,431 observations are represented in five 
activity sectors, 8.5% of the observations are 
integrated in the agricultural sector, 19.3% in the 
industrial sector, 19.4% in the consumer goods 
sector, 31.4% are related to services and 21.4% are 
included in the financial sector. Of the total listed 
Brazilian firms included in the sample 21.7% are 
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listed in the New Market and 78.3% are listed in the 
Traditional Market.  
 
5.  RESULTS 
 
5.1. Descriptive results 
 
Table 1 describes summary statistics by industry. 
The value of the working capital variation is 
influenced by past, current, and future cash flows 
from operations (CFO). Brazilian firms have, on 
average, positive operating cash flows, which mean 
that the revenues related to the operational activities 
generate receipts that cover the operational costs 
and subsequent outflows within the operational 
cycle. Only the agriculture sector has negative 
operating cash flows and simultaneously presents 
the highest working capital variation. The quality of 
financial reporting measured by the variable EQ is 
greater in industrials, services and financials and 
smaller in the commerce sector.  
 
Table 1. Analysis of earnings quality by industry  
 
  Mean 
Activity Sector N EQ ∆ Working Capital CFO 
(t-1)
 CFO 
(t)
 CFO 
(t+1)
 
Agriculture 377 -0.11 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
Industrials 854 -0.09 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Commerce 858 -0.17 -0.02 0.04 0.07 0.04 
Services 1,392 -0.09 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Financial 950 -0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.04 
 
Median 
N EQ ∆ Working Capital CFO 
(t-1)
 CFO 
(t)
 CFO 
(t+1)
 
Agriculture 377 -0.05 0.02 0 0 0 
Industrials 854 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Commerce 858 -0.08 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 
Services 1,392 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 
Financial 950 -0.03 0 0 0.01 0.01 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive evidence for the 
variables used in the multiple linear regression 
model Brazilian firms have average leverage of 67%, 
and about half of the firms have a maximum 
leverage ratio of 26%. Firms in the traditional market 
are more leveraged, and report more losses in the 
sample period. The size of the firms is similar in 
both markets 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics by market  
 
 N Mean Standard Dev. P25 P50 P75 
Panel A: All Firms 
Earnings Quality 4,431 -0.11 0.26 -0.12 -0.05 -0.02 
Size 4,431 13.51 2.44 12.2 13.75 15.01 
Loss 4,431 0.29 0.46 0 0 1.00 
Leverage 4,431 0.67 6.6 0.09 0.26 0.4 
Panel B: By market 
Traditional Market 
Earnings Quality 3,470 -0.11 0.29 -0.12 -0.05 -0.02 
Size 3,470 13.38 2.56 11.93 13.55 15.01 
Loss 3,470 0.32 0.47 0 0 1.00 
Leverage 3,470 0.78 7.45 0.09 0.25 0.4 
New Market 
Earnings Quality 961 -0.09 0.11 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 
Size 961 14.00 1.92 13.15 14.08 15.02 
Loss 961 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 
Leverage 961 0.27 0.19 0.11 0.27 0.4 
 
Taking into account the calculation of earnings 
quality EQ (i.e. higher values represent higher 
reporting quality), we observe that the average 
quality of financial reporting is greater in the New 
Market (-0.09) where firms have better levels of 
governance. In the Traditional market average 
earnings quality is -0.11. In Table 3 we report 
univariate tests comparing EQ of firms in the two 
markets. The difference in EQ is statistically 
significant at the 1% level for the mean and at the 
10% level for the median. 
These univariate results suggest that Brazilian 
firms with best governance practices listed in the 
New Market disclose better quality financial 
reporting. Thus, the reported financial information 
is more reliable and useful for investors' decision 
making. 
 
Table 3. Tests of EQ by market  
 
  N Mean Median 
Market    
Traditional Market 3,470 -0.11 -0.05 
New Market 961 -0.09 -0.05 
Test difference in mean EQ p-value <0.001 
   Test difference in median EQ p-value 0.071 
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Pearson correlations are reported in Table 4. 
There is a positive correlation between the variables 
market, size and EQ. Again the correlation analysis 
indicates that when a firm is listed in the market 
New Market earnings quality is also higher.  
 
Table 4. Pearson correlations 
 
 
EQ Market Size Leverage Loss 
EQ 1.00 
    
Market 0.04* 1.00 
   
Size 0.16* 0.10* 1.00 
  
Leverage -0.11* -0.03* -0.11* 1.00 
 
Loss -0.15* -0.10* -0.37* 0.08* 1.00 
* statistically significant at 5% level. 
 
5.2. Multivariate analysis 
 
To confirm the univariate evidence of a positive 
association between governance practices and the 
transparency of financial reporting we apply a 
multivariate analysis (equation 1). Table 5 presents 
the following four models: Column (1) shows the 
results for the model with all observations, including 
the year and industry fixed effects. Column (2) 
reports the results for the model with all 
observations including only year fixed effects. The 
columns (3) and (4) presents the results of the model 
estimation excluding outliers using Kuh and Welsch 
(1980) criterion. We consider the possibility that 
extreme cases can influence our results. 
 
Table 5. EQ 
 
  
 
Dependent variable: Earnings quality (EQ) 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Market Coefficient 0.02** 0.02* 0.01*** 0.01*** 
  t-stat (1.99) (1.87) (3.14) (3.09) 
Size Coefficient 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
  t-stat (6.36) (7.29) (6.19) (8.24) 
Leverage Coefficient -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  t-stat (-5.52) (-5.91) (-2.82) (-3.46) 
Loss Coefficient -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
  t-stat (0.60) (-6.87) (-7.45) (-7.07) 
      
Constant Coefficient -0.1*** -0.3*** -0.4*** -0.6*** 
  t-stat (-6.72) (-8.07) (-13.40) (-15.74) 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes No Yes No 
Nº of observations 
 
4,431 4,431 4,155 4,155 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.06 0.05 0.09 0.07 
t -statistics in parentheses; * (**) [***] denotes statistical significance at 10% (5%) [1%]. 
 
In all models in Table 5 we observe that the EQ 
variable is positively related with the type of market. 
Thus, when the company is listed in the New Market, 
instead of the Traditional Market, earnings quality 
increases. These results suggest that investors and 
regulators can rely on the positive informational 
benefits of the New Market. In other words, Brazilian 
firms of the New Market have better corporate 
governance structures supporting a more 
transparency financial reporting. Firm size is 
positively associated with earnings quality, more 
leveraged firms and firms with losses have power 
reporting quality.  
The elimination of outliers and the inclusion or 
not of industry effects does not change our results.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Most of the literature argues that the level of 
corporate governance is positively related to the 
earnings quality (Doyle et al, 2007; Kent et al, 2010; 
Larcker et al., 2007). To find evidence of that 
relationship in an emerging market we analyze the 
case of the Brazilian markets, where firms can be 
listed in one of two markets depending on the 
standard of corporate governance levels they wish to 
commit to. Firms that follow high quality 
governance principles can be listed in the New 
Market whereas the other firms are listed in the 
Traditional Market. Policy makers have chosen the 
two-layer market approach as a way to signal to 
investors (particularly foreign ones) the quality of 
the firms. Given that creating and monitoring a new 
market is costly, it is important to understand 
whether the New Market results in benefits for 
investors, namely in terms of more transparent 
information for decision-making. In this study we 
test whether firms included in the Brazilian New 
Market have more transparent information as 
measured by Dechow and Dichev (2002)’s accruals 
models. 
The empirical results suggest that earnings 
quality of firms in the New Market are more 
transparent than earnings quality of firms in the 
Traditional Market. These results indicate that the 
best practice of corporate governance leads to more 
reliable financial information that is useful for 
stakeholders. Further, we found that firms have 
other characteristics influence the quality of 
financial reports. Large firms have better earnings 
quality, but firms with higher level of debt and 
higher incidence of losses show poor earnings 
quality.  
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